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WHISTLING PAST THE WASTE SITE:
DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR




Federal statutes imposing liability for hazardous waste cleanup
costs raise numerous issues directly affecting the personal liability
of directors and officers ("D&Os"). The most important issues of
concern to D&Os are liability and funding. The liability issue deals
with who will bear the cleanup costs; the funding issue deals with
how those costs will be financed. Courts have resolved the liability
issue with the apparently simple rule that under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)1 and the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), 2 "the 'polluter pays.,'" The issue of funding,
on the other hand, has not been so easily resolved; determining how
costs are to be financed often balances on how a court interprets
the coverage provided by an insurance contract.
t B.S. 1984, United States Naval Academy; J.D. Candidate 1992, University of
Pennsylvania. The author thanks Stephen Cozen andJeffrey Lange for their helpful
suggestions on this Comment.
1 RCRA, §§ 1002-9010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988).
2 CERCLA, §§ 101-157, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
3 G.S. Peter Bergen, A 1987 Supe fund Primer, RISK MGMT.,July 1987, at 20, 20-21.
Federal courts have interpreted CERCLA liability provisions to encompass strict
liability, joint and several liability, and retroactive liability. See United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 & n.11 (4th Cir. 1988) (indicating the court's
agreement "with the overwhelmingbody of precedent that has interpreted [CERCLA]
as establishing a strict liability scheme"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); id. at 171
(noting that "[w]hile CERCLA does not mandate the imposition ofjoint and several
liability, it permits it in cases of indivisible harm"); United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that
CERCLA imposes retroactive liability), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); see also H.R.
REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 74 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2856 (stating congressional support for a uniform federal rule of joint and
several liability under CERCLA).
(241)
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The problem underlying the funding issue is a basic flaw in the
notion that "the polluter pays." Although such a notion is appealing
in that it furthers the goals of expediting the cleanup process and
reducing the amount of hazardous waste costs borne by taxpayers,
it arguably hinders the cleanup process by raising the costs
associated with a complicated litigation/settlement process.4 The
strict, retroactive, and joint and several liability of "the polluter
pays" notion negates the relevance of cautionary steps taken by
individuals. Because strict liability is imposed without regard to
willfulness or negligence and retroactive liability is imposed for
actions legally acceptable prior to the standard of care established
under GERCLA, liability for environmental cleanup approaches
absolute liability.
5
Even those D&Os who are not directly involved in hazardous
waste management or chemical industries are potentially liable
under CERCLA. The challenges posed by the issue of hazardous
waste cleanups are fundamental to almost all applications of the
business management process. 6 First, wastes occur at all points in
4 See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 176-77 (Widener,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing "the vagaries of and delays in... subsequent suit for contribution
might result in needless financial disaster"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
5 For instance, a safety-conscious generator who keeps exact records and who can
show that state of the art techniques were used when 10 barrels of hazardous waste
were placed in a 10,000 barrel site might still be held accountable for more of the
cleanup costs than an operator who carelessly disposes of 1,000 unsafe barrels in the
same site. See, e.g.,Joan T. Schmit, Historical Development and Use ofJoint and Several
Liability, 42 CPCUJ. 144, 149-50 (1989); see also Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 176 (Widener,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the joint and several liability of
a small generator that deposited "a few gallons of relatively innocuous waste liquid
at a site" for the entire cost of cleanup); William W. Balcke, Superfund Settlements: The
Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments, 74 VA. L. REv. 123, 137 (1988) (noting the
EPA's "willingness to demand more from responsible parties than their allocable
shares of total costs, should it appear that collection of all costs would otherwise be
impossible").
Furthermore, the combination of absolute liability withjoint and several liability
provides an incentive for potentially responsible parties (PRPs) to attempt to delay
litigation and settlement in efforts to join other PRPs and thereby spread liability for
the cleanup costs. See Carroll E. Dubuc & William D. Evans Jr., Recent Developments
Under CERCLA: Toward a More Equitable Distribution of Liability, 17 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,197, 10,200 (1987) (discussing United States v. Conservation
Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985), in which the original EPA suit
against seven defendants snowballed into a suit with third-party claims against 154
generator defendants, 16 insurance company defendants, and 14 federal agency
defendants); see also 603 Parties Named in CERCLA Suit By Two Companies Seeking
Contribution, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1209 (Oct. 26, 1990) (illustrating the proliferation
of defendants in CERCLA litigation through a discussion of New York v. Ludlow's
Sanitary Landfill, Inc., No. 86-CV-853 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1990)).
6 See FREDRICK D. STURDivANT, BUsINESs AND SOCIETY: A MANAGERIAL APPROACH
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the production, distribution, and consumption cycle, including the
discovery, recovery, processing, and transportation of raw materials,
the fabrication and assembly of finished products, and the consump-
tion and disposal of those products. 7 Hazardous wastes can be
generated as by-products of manufacturing, 8 released from cor-
porate equipment (such as factory machinery),9 and even absorbed
into the soil of property acquired for investment by a corpora-
tion.1 0 Because waste is so pervasive in industrial activity, busi-
nesses without some nexus to any hazardous waste site are the
exception. Second, hazardous waste is an unintentional by-product
of business enterprise.1 1 A chemical perceived as safe by present-
313 (1981).
7 See id.
8 See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,
729-30 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding a corporation liable for a disinfectant hexachloro-
phene manufacturing process which produced various hazardous and toxic by-
products), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Superior Court,
257 Cal. Rptr. 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing the release of various toxic
chemicals as by-products of rocket engine and related aerospace product develop-
ment); Michael S. Baram, Chemical Industry Hazards: Liability, Insurance, and the Role
of Risk Analysis, in INSURING AND MANAGING HAZARDOUS RISKS: FROM SEVESO TO
BHOPAL AND BEYOND 415 (Paul R. Kleindorfer & Howard C. Kunreuther eds., 1987)
[hereinafter INSURING AND MANAGING HAZARDoUs RISKS] (stating "a semiconductor
firm may use over 2500 chemicals, many of them highly toxic, in the manufacture of
chips and other computer parts").
9 See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1990)
(assessing liability for the spillage of hazardous substance used in an industrial
scouring system), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991); United States v. Carolina
Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1033-34 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (holding a company
liable for release of PCB-contaminated fluid from electrical transformers). But see
CERCLA, § 101(9)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B) (1988) (excluding from the definition
of "facility" "any consumer product in consumer use"); ef. Florida Power & Light Co.
v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that makers
of electrical equipment containing PCBs do not necessarily share superfund liability
for cleanup of the hazardous substance when it is later released from the product).
10 See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating
"[t]he plain language of [CERCLA § 107(a)(2)] extends liability to owners of waste
facilities [as defined in CERCLA § 101(9)(A)-(B)] regardless of their degree of
participation in the subsequent disposal of hazardous waste"), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1106 (1989); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90-92
(3rd Cir. 1988) (finding survivor corporation liable for cleanup of land acquired
through merger), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989); New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding the corporate officer/controlling
stockholder liable for CERCLA response costs at known dump site purchased by
corporation). But see CERCLA, §§ 101(35)(b), 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(B),
9607(b)(3) (1988) (relieving a landowner from initial liability on proof that after "all
appropriate inquiry.., consistent with good commercial or customary practice" the
landowner still had no reason to know of the presence of hazardous substances).
11 See STURDIVANT, supra note 6, at 313.
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day standards, may later engender a long-term hazard to the
environment, 12 resulting in long-term liability for those individuals
involved in its release. Even a company that performs the most
current risk analyses and invests in monitoring costs and state of the
art safety precautions cannot shield itself from liability if contami-
nation occurs, or has occurred, due to former practices.13 Third,
the social costs of pollution are not necessarily absorbed by those
who enjoy the social benefit of the good producing the hazardous
waste by-products. 14 Therefore, without regulatory or market
action, risk-creating activities are not internalized by commercial
enterprises.
15
In CERCLA suits, courts have held that common law principles
of limited liability for D&Os, traditionally provided by the corporate
structure,1 6 are not applicable. 17 This loss of common law pro-
tection for business decisions is further compounded by judicial
interpretations of D&O liability insurance coverage. Unable to deny
D&O personal liability because of "the polluter pays" premise, the
same courts have also found that D&O liability insurance does not
cover insureds' environmental decisions. Indeed, even where the
12 See CERCLA, § 104(i)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(2)(B) (1988); see also EPA
Regulates Three Wood Preserving Wastes Over Objections From White House Budget Office,
21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1555-56 (Dec. 14, 1990) (reporting that the OMB determined
that a new EPA regulation placed on wood preservative wastes, see 55 Fed. Reg.
50,450 (1990), would cost approximately $7.2 trillion for each statistical cancer case
prevented).
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
14 See STURDIVANT, supra note 6, at 313.
15 Even if regulatory action is taken, analyses of problems, approvals from
government agencies, and the implementation of plans require significant lead time
and start-up costs. See id. at 314.
16 See 13A WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 6214 (perm. ed. rev. 1990).
17 See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,
743-46 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding president and vice-president of pharmaceutical
manufacturer individually liable), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding corporate officer/
controlling stockholder liable for CERCLA response costs); United States v.
Conservation Chem., 628 F. Supp. 391,420 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (supplemental opinion)
(finding CEO/majority stockholder of chemical company individually liable); United
States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 894-95 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (finding corporate officer/
principal shareholder individually liable); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898,
913-14 (D.N.H. 1985) (finding president/sole shareholder of chemical corporation
personally liable). But cf. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th
Cir. 1990) (stating that "[w]ithout an express Congressional directive to the contrary,
common-law principles of corporation law, such as limited liability, govern [the]
court's analysis"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991).
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courts read general liability coverage into D&O liability insurance
agreements, their means of finding coverage forebode an unstable
body of state common law. Two problems result from these judicial
interpretations: first, conventional insurance actuarial techniques
in premium setting become inapplicable,18 and second, because of
the lack of tenable legal standards to guide decisions, corporate
D&Os engage in risk-averse decision making.
19
This Comment traces the development of individual D&O
liability and analyzes the public and private sectors' reactions to
increased individual liability. Part I of this Comment focuses on
sources of liability for environmental decisions, including evolving
notions of limited liability under the common law. In reviewing the
reasons for common law protection in other areas, the appropriate-
ness of common law limited liability protection for environmental
decisions will also be considered. Part I concludes that standards,
similar to business judgment rule standards, are warranted for
environmental decisions.
If the courts will not provide common law standards to protect
the decisions of D&Os in the environmental context, political and
market alternatives must be provided. Part II considers the political
alternatives to common law protection. State statutory responses,
especially in light of their interaction with a federal statute such as
CERCLA, will be considered, and the effects of limited liability
statutes and the flaws of indemnification statutes will be shown.
Part II concludes that state statutory responses to the lack of
common law protection are desirable but may not be effective.
Part III analyzes D&O liability insurance as the market alterna-
tive to statutory and common law protection. The role of liability
18 See Stephen P. D'Arcy & Edwin Herricks, Pricing InsuranceforPollution Damage,
42 CPCUJ. 74, 84 (1989) (discussing the inappropriateness of standard "reactive"
rate-making techniques). But see Martin T. Katzman, Environmental Impairment
Insurance and the Regulation of Chemical Pollution, 39 CPCUJ. 163,164 (1986) (arguing
that setting insurance rates was only a transitional problem).
19 This problem is twofold: the lack of legal standards blurs the threshold of
liability, making corporate D&Os more vulnerable to personal liability, while
increased claim susceptibility causes the D&O insurance market to respond by
restricting coverage availability and increasing coverage costs.
The insurance market's reaction is seen in three separate changes in the
availability of coverage: increases in deductible and coinsurance levels, lower
aggregate policy limits, and expansion of coverage exclusions. See George L. Priest,
The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1571 (1987). See
generally id. at 1571-76 (discussing how increasing legal risks generated by changes in
tort law results in the flight of low-risk insureds from the insurance market, reducing
the general availability of affordable insurance).
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insurance in protecting D&Os from personal liability under
CERCLA will be considered in light ofjudicial construction of D&O
liability insurance coverage. In conclusion, part III suggests that
even though the environmental risks associated with GEROLA
liability may be insurable, the unstable body of law surrounding
both D&O personal liability and the coverage provided by D&O
liability insurance are too uncertain for conventional underwriting
methods. Without legislative intervention or significant judicial
rethinking of the role of insurance and its ability to protect
potentially liable D&Os, insurance will not continue to be an
effective alternative to the lack of public sector protection.
CERCLA's absolute liability scheme provides no incentive for
insurers to monitor the decision-making process, for if environmen-
tal liability is truly fundamental to the business management
process, D&O environmental liability will be uninsurable.
I. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER PERSONAL LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
Even though CERCLA is the basis for general liability for
environmental hazards, it is the federal courts that have created the
"evolving principles of federal common law" which impose strict,
joint and several, and retroactive personal liability on responsible
individuals.20 These evolving principles of federal common law
conflict with state common law limitations on corporate liability.
The traditional common law doctrine of limited liability provides
that the corporate entity is usually liable for violations of statutes
rather than those officers, directors, and shareholders who make up
the corporate entity.2 1 This common law doctrine of limited
liability reflects the uncertainty and risk-taking implicated in every
business decision:
Businessmen make business decisions. They are not courts,
able and willing to pursue a matter to the last argument in the
search of the "right" answer. They are not researchers meticulous-
ly seeking truth. They are not scientists striving for ever more
refined solutions in a field of narrow specialization.... The
decisions the businessman must make are fraught with risk, and he
is quite accustomed to making these decisions in a hurry on the
basis of a hunch and manifestly sparse data. The businessman and
the board of directors thrive or die in a sea of uncertainty.
22
20 See supra note 3.
21 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 89-90 (1985).
22 Bayless Manning, The BusinessJudgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention:
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In contrast to the state common law notion of limited liability
are developing federal common law notions of individual liability
for environmental decisions. 23 In the forum of CERCLA liability,
this increased exposure of individual D&Os to personal risk is a
result of broad judicial application of CERCLA's liability provisions
compounded by heightened judicial standards in determining D&O
liability for business decisions.
24
Since CEROLA imposes civil liability for environmental haz-
ards,25 whether this liability applies derivatively to D&Os is the
fundamental question. "A corporate officer may not be held civilly
liable for a corporate violation of [a federal environmental statute]
unless either the Act itself authorizes such liability, or there are
sufficient allegations and proof to permit negation of the corporate
form."2 6 When courts choose to apply individual derivative civil
liability for corporate environmental violations, they circumvent the
fundamental notions of the corporate form and the limited liability
doctrine. Such decisions not only are questionable interpretations
of statutory provisions, but they are also contrary to the body of law
created to protect official decisions made using good business judg-
ment.
27
Normally, the business judgment rule protects directors from
shareholder suits for corporate losses. Similar protection from
government suit would protect officers from derivative environmen-
tal liability. Such a rule should not protect D&Os who personally
Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1482 (1984).
23 See ThomasJ. Niekamp, Note, Individual Liability of Corporate Officers, Directors,
and Shareholders for Violations of Environmental Laws, 14 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 379,382-
89 (1987) (discussing the legal development of individual liability for corporate
conduct); David E. Preston, Comment, Dissolving the Corporate Veil: Corporate Officer
Liability for Response Costs Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act, 17 U. TOL. L. REv. 923, 933-36 (1986) (discussing theories upon
which individual liability may be predicated).
24 For an example of a court's use of a standard of "gross negligence" to mitigate
the business judgment rule, see the celebrated case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See also infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text (discussing
the business judgment rule).
25 See CERCLA, § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
26 United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1300 (5th Cir. 1976).
27 The business judgment rule provides that the court will not second-guess the
merits of a management decision if the five elements of the rule are found: "a
business decision, disinterestedness, due care, good faith, and (according to some
courts and commentators) no abuse of discretion or waste." DENNISJ. BLOCK ET AL.,
THE BUSINEsS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 2 (3rd
ed. 1989).
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participate in environmental contamination by making reckless or
grossly negligent environmental decisions, but should protect
decisions to use the most environmentally safe means available at
the time the decision is made. Such a common law rule, similar to
the business judgment rule, may counteract the legal environment
of increased personal exposure to environmental liability.
A. CERCLA Liability of Directors and Officers:
Traditional and Federal Common Law
The courts have generally construed CEROLA as imposing
personal liability on individual corporate officers whom the
government has chosen to pursue as part of its enforcement
strategy. 28 A "person" is liable under section 10729 if the govern-
ment incurs expense costs30 for a "release, or a threatened re-
lease"3 1 of a "hazardous substance."3 2  GERCLA provides for
four classes of potentially responsible persons (PRIPs): (1) current
owners or operators of a disposal facility,33 (2) owners or opera-
tors of a disposal facility at the time of disposal, 4 (3) generators
of hazardous waste, 5 and (4) transporters of hazardous waste.3
6
CERCLA's definitions do not specifically state that corporate D&Os
are "owners or operators." 37 Additionally, sections 107(a)(3) and
28 The reasoning behind holding individual officers liable, however, varies.
Compare Gregory P. O'Hara, Minimizing Exposure to Environmental Liabilities for
Corporate Officers, Directors, Shareholders and Successors, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HicH TECH. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1990) (claiming that "any person" is the critical term of
CERCLA § 107 that "reaches beyond the protection of the corporate shell and
attaches liability") with Barnett M. Lawrence, Comment, Liability of Corporate Officers
under CERCLA: An Ounce of Prevention May Be the Cure, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,377, 10,378 (1990) (claiming that the issue is "whether an officer is an
'owner or operator' under CERCLA § 107(a)(2)"). See generally New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (using both "owner or operator"
and "person" in statutory construction to find individual liability).
29 See CERCLA, § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
30 See id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
31 Id. § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
32 Id. § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
33 See id. § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).
s4 See id. § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
35 See id. § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (defining such a party as "any person
who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or
arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances").
36 See id. § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (defining a transporter as "any person
who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport").
37 See id. § 101(20), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20).
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(a)(4) do not address management decisions or persons in positions
of authority over those persons who may have arranged for disposal,
treatment, or transportation of hazardous waste.3 8  Therefore,
while CEROLA's liability provisions provide for personal liability,
judicial construction is necessary to apply that personal liability to
corporate D&Os.
The intention of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
place personal responsibility upon corporate officers and inside
directors3 9 is evident in the regulation of permit signatories under
RCRA. 40 All corporate permit applications must be signed by an
officer at the rank of "a president, secretary, treasurer, or any vice
president in charge of a principal business function."4 1 Further-
more, permit documents specifically remind the signer of the
possibility of fine or imprisonment for deceptive information.
42
It is not clear whether outside directors fall within CERCLA's
broad liability provisions.43 Evolving standards of liability, empha-
38 See id. § 107(a)(3)-(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3)-(a)(4). It may be argued that the
"otherwise arranged for" language of § 107(3) goes to management decisions, but
such an argument loses its persuasiveness as the director's decision, resulting in
disposal, treatment, or transportation, becomes attenuated from the actual disposal,
treatment, or transportation activity by layers of intervening authority.
" "[S]tate corporation laws do not distinguish between inside and outside
directors," but "courts and commentators are beginning to look at them differently"
for purposes of liability. WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.09 (4th ed. 1988). Courts will probably
look to outside directors' actions to determine their independence from management.
See id. § 1.10.
40 See EPA Consolidated Permit Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 270.11 (1990).
41 Id. § 270.11(a)(1). The EPA found it necessary to define further the rank of the
signator from the original requirement of"a principal executive officer of at least the
level of vice-president" under the previous regulation, see 40 C.F.R. § 122.6(a)(1)
(1980), to the present requirement, avoiding any misunderstanding that real authority
is required. See 48 Fed. Reg. 39,612-13 (1983); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 52,149 (1980)
(clarifying 40 C.F.R. § 122.6 (1980)).
42 See 40 C.F.R. § 270.11(d) (1990).
43 If the key term is "any person," making all individuals liable regardless of the
corporate shell, then even outside directors are jointly and severally liable for their
participation on the board which makes the decision. See CERCLA, § 107 (a)(2)-
(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)-(a)(4) (1988); O'Hara, supra note 28, at 6 (stating that
the significance of the term "any person" is that it reaches beyond the corporate shell
attaching liability to any individual or corporation fitting within the class made
potentially liable). If, however, the definition of "owner or operator" is equally
important, then broad construction of that phrase may determine that participation
in management of a "facility" as an "operator" is not equivalent to participation in
management of a corporation as a fiduciary, and without any indicia of ownership the
outside director is excluded from liability for his corporate decisions. See CERCLA,
§ 101(9), (20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9), (20)(A) (1988); see also, Lawrence, supra note
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sizing control or authority, 44 make it unlikely, however, that a
court will fail to find an outside director liable for her relationship
to business decisions affecting the facility.
45
As was articulated above, courts often read into CERC[A a
congressional intention to find corporate D&Os individually liable
for their environmental decisions. However, courts must also
bypass the common law notions of limited liability protecting
management decisions. The courts must, therefore, create common
law to justify an imposition of personal liability on D&Os, for they
cannot merely rely on the language of CERCLA.
Under traditional common law, even though a corporation may
be strictly liable for the consequences of a management decision,
the mere holding of corporate office does not in and of itself make
the officer personally liable for management decisions. 46 Corpo-
rate officers are protected by a "fiduciary shield."47 This fiduciary
shield is not, however, impenetrable. Under a common law
"personal participation" theory, a corporate officer can be held
directly liable for the corporation's torts. To be held directly liable,
the officer must have personally participated in the tortious
activity.48 Under the personal participation theory, an officer is
personally liable for any wrongful acts she commits, even those
committed on behalf of the corporate employer and within the
scope of her duties.49 This theory has been given liberal effect by
28, at 10,378 (concluding that the broad standard of liability is consistent with
CERCLA's purposes and is good policy).
44 See Lawrence, supra note 28, at 10,380-81 (identifying a line of cases finding
individual responsibility for day-to-day management and operations to be grounds for
liability).
45 See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 21 (D.R.I. 1989) (no-
ting that precedent exists in which a "stockholder, parent corporation, or any person
associated with a facility whether he or she has any ownership interest or not, may be
held liable if that person... controls the management and operation of the polluting
corporation"), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991).
46 See Williams v. United States, No. 88-157-ALB-AMER, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15,846, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 1989) (citing Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d
1210, 1214 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970)).
47 See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 27, at 29.
48 See Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir.
1980) (stating that, as a general rule, personal participation includes "'[s]pecific
direction or sanction of, or active participation or cooperation in, a positively
wrongful act of commission or omission'" (quoting Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores,
261 F.2d 406, 408-09 (10th Cir. 1958))); see also United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,744 (8th Cir. 1986) (comparing derivative
liability premised upon defendant's status as a corporate officer with personal liability
for actual participation in the tort), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
49 See 3A WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
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some courts50 and has been applied in the environmental context
to impose both civil and criminal liability on corporate officers.
5 1
It is, however, a theory that is based on direct liability for the
wrongful act of the officer, and is different from the major concern
of CEROLA liability-that personal derivative liability will result from
a business decision taken with due care.
Derivative liability is not a normal means of finding personal
civil liability in the corporate context. Derivative liability of
corporate officers is usually found in criminal cases in which a
criminal statute "imposes the highest standard of care and permits
conviction of responsible corporate officials who.., have the power
to prevent or correct violations of its provisions."52 Although
corporate officers have been held derivatively liable for criminal
CoRPoRATIoNs § 1135 (perm. ed. rev. 1986 & Supp. 1990).
50 For example, as one court observed:
To be held directly liable as an operator, courts have considered a number
of factors including: whether the person or corporation had the capacity to
discover in a timely fashion the release or threat of release of hazardous
substances; whether the person or corporation had the power to direct the
mechanisms causing the release; and whether the person or corporation had
the capacity to prevent and abate damages.
United States v. Carolina Transformer, Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1038 (E.D.N.C. 1989).
None of these factors indicates the level of culpability to be considered. Carolina
Transformer is arguably an easy case-the officers were aware of the environmental
problem, but "took no actions to correct the problem or change the work habits of
employees"-evidencing gross negligence. Id. A standard of gross negligence would
comport with the common law. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del.
1985) (stating that director liability is based on concepts of gross negligence).
CERCLA, however, imposes strict liability. See supra note 3. Strict liability for
corporate decisions does not accord with the businessjudgement rule. See infra notes
63-73 and accompanying text (discussing the business judgment rule).
51 See Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 744-45 (holding corporate officers
liable for response costs under CERCLA and abatement costs under RCRA); United
States v. Pollution Abatement Servs., 763 F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir.) (imposing civil
liability on corporate officers for violating § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropria-
tion Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (1988)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037 (1985);
United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1124 (3d Cir. 1979) (imposing
criminal liability on corporate officers for violation of Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980). But
cf. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990) (refusing to
alter "common-law principles of corporation law, such as limited liability... [w]ithout
an express Congressional directive to the contrary"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017
(1991). See generally Truxton Hare, Comment, Reluctant Soldiers: The Criminal
Liability of Corporate Officers for Negligent Violations of the Clean Water Act, 138 U. PA.
L. REv. 935 (1990) (discussing the evolution of strict and vicarious liability for
criminal violations of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988)).
52 See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 676 (1975).
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violations of environmental laws, 53 courts are less likely to impose
derivative civil liability on corporate officers.
54
Because of the different risks of personal liability between direct
and derivative civil liability, a perplexing concern for corporate
officers must be whether a decision regarding a corporation's
hazardous materials will be evaluated by the EPA and the courts as
personal participation in a wrongful act. This uncertainty is
compounded by the knowledge that, if they are liable individually,
their individual liability will be joint and several with other PRPs for
the cleanup costs, even if they used the most conservative decision-
making process.
55
In addition to the traditional common law theories that
support the imposition of personal liability on D&Os, courts can
also turn to federal common law. Under the federal common law
there are at least two additional approaches that can be used to
impose personal liability on D&Os. In the GERCLA context, the
most common approach is to "look to the language and purpose of
the statute in determining whether Congressional intent favors
protection of the corporate form."56 CERGLA liability decisions
applying such an approach are inconsistent with one another;
congressional intent has been read both for and against imposing
personal liability.57 A second federal common law approach is a
heavily fact-specific "prevention test." This approach was intro-
5s See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 670 (3d Cir. 1984)
(finding knowledge of RCRA violations could be inferred to corporate defendants in
positions of responsibility in order to hold them criminally liable), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1208 (1985); Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1124 (finding individual defendants liable
as responsible corporate officers).
54 See Pollution Abatement Servs., 763 F.2d at 134-35 (distinguishing United States
v. Sexton Cove, 526 F.2d 1293, 1300-01 (5th Cir. 1976), which construed an
analogous environmental statute as precluding civil derivative, as opposed to personal,
liability).
55 See supra notes 3 & 5.
" O'Hara, supra note 28, at 4-5; see also Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d
215, 221 (1st Cir. 1981) (indicating that courts applying federal common law "will
look closely at the purpose of the federal statute to determine whether the statute
places importance on the corporate form, an inquiry that usually gives less respect to
the corporate form than does the strict common law alter ego doctrine" (citations
omitted)).
57 CompareJoslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1990)
(finding no indication that Congress intended to alter basic tenets of corporation law
in CERCLA's legislative intent or language), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991) with
Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1554, 1560-62 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (finding
that CERCLA's statutory scheme displaces traditional corporate principles oflimited
liability, but requiring more than mere status as a corporate officer or director).
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duced and applied in Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co.58 and Kelley ex rel.
Michigan Natural Resources Commission v. ARCO Industries.59 In
both cases, the court based its test on a finding that "[a]lthough
liability under CERCLA is essentially a strict liability scheme, the
case law indicates that where CERCLA seeks to impose liability
beyond the corporate form, an individual's power to control the
practice and policy of the corporation, and the responsibility
undertaken by that individual... should be considered."6 ° At the
very least, such a test allows corporate D&Os to prove that the
practices used and individual precautions taken to prevent the
release of hazardous substances meet a threshold standard of care.
By meeting such a standard, individual D&Os would avoid joint and
several liability with other PRPs for accidental releases of hazardous
substances. Such a standard reflects the traditional common law
notions underlying the business judgment rule. The prevention
test, therefore, reflects the uncertainty involved in many corporate
decisions that have potential environmental effects and promotes
responsible decision-making.
Nevertheless, more conclusive theories for imposing personal
liability on D&Os may be evolving under the federal common law.
For instance, a federal common law theory of individual liability
called the "central figure" theory has been applied in cases dealing
with violations of domestic fuel price controls.61 Under this theo-
ry, the person who played the "central role" in corporate wrongdo-
ing is fully liable. The question of whether the defendant played a
central role is based on a fact-specific analysis of her role and
actions. 62  According to the central role theory, the defendant
may be held liable even if she did not participate in the actual
commission of the tort.
58 727 F. Supp. 1554 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
59 723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
60 Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. at 1562.
61 See, e.g., Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Herrington, 826 F.2d 16, 25
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) (holding the central figure, who conducted and authorized
negotiations leading to corporate misconduct, liable for entire amount of restitution),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987); United States v. Sutton, 795 F.2d 1040, 1063 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that "[a] person who is the 'animating force' for
regulatory violations is fully liable"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987).
62 See Citronelle.Mobile Gathering, 826 F.2d at 23-25.
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B. Establishing a Standard of Care For Environmental Decisions
In the corporate context, D&Os owe a fiduciary duty to
shareholders of their corporation. That duty consists of a duty of
loyalty and a duty of reasonable care.63 If D&Os breach that duty,
they are susceptible to shareholder suits.6 Should such a suit
arise, D&Os, in defending their actions as fiduciaries, can rely on
the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule protects
D&Os from liability for corporate losses caused by honest mistakes
of judgment; it presumes that D&Os have complied with their
fiduciary duties.65  Even where that presumption is contested,
D&Os are protected from judicial second-guessing of their business
decisions if such decisions are made while exercising due (or
ordinary) care, acting in good faith, and having a reasonable belief
that the actions are in the corporation's best interest.66 The rule
is an efficient one. Based on the theory that some risk-taking is
desirable in maximizing corporate profitability,67 the business
judgment rule reduces disincentives for good faith risk-taking by
limiting D&Os' liability.
Although the business judgment rule protects D&Os from
judicial second-guessing when defending against shareholder suits,
similar protection may not be available for environmental decisions
resulting in potential CERCLA liability. 68  First, the rule is only
applicable when the cause of action is based on the breach of a
fiduciary duty69 and when D&Os act lawfully.70 Thus, the rule
63 See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 27, at 1; KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 39, § 1.04.
64 See 3 FLETCHER, supra note 49, § 990 (perm. ed. rev. 1986).
65 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814-15 (Del. 1984). See generally S. Samuel
Arsht, The BusinessJudgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFsTRA L. REV. 93 (1979) (tracing the
origin, development, and meaning of the business judgment rule).
6 See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 27, at 2-3; see also REVISED MODEL BusINESs CORP.
ACT § 8.30 (1984) (codifying the business judgment rule as a standard of conduct).
The rule has been codified as a general standard of conduct for directors in a
majority of the states. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1990); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
67 SeeJoy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 7.17 reporter's note 2, at 244 (Tent. Draft No. 6, A.L.I. 1986) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]; Dale A. Oesterle, Limits On a Corporation's
Protection of Its Directors and Officers From Personal Liability, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 513,
514.
6 But see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (commenting that the
prevention test applied by the United States District Court for the Western District
of Michigaif approximates a business judgment rule standard).
69 See KIEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 39, § 6.02 ("[The rule] has no role where
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would not apply in a case where management fails to disclose
adequately information regarding environmental risk-taking or
potential environmental problems to investors as required by
federal securities laws.
7 1
directors either have abdicated their functions or have failed to act, unless the failure
to act resulted from a conscious decision not to act.").
70 See Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 125 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing the actions of
pension fund directors in terms of the fiduciary duties imposed by the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
71 See generally James G. Archer et al., SEC Reporting of Environmental Liabilities,
20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,105 (1990) (analyzing significance of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) release on disclosure requirements and
potential liability of registrants).
In 1989, the SEC clarified its environmental disclosure requirements in an
interpretive release. See Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-6835; 34-26831;
IC-16961, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,430 (1989) [hereinafter MD&A Release].
Essentially, there are four major types of environmental contingencies that may
require disclosure: (1) if compliance with "command and control" environmental law
requirements (such as installation of pollution control equipment) may have a
material effect on a registrant; (2) if initiation or potential initiation of toxic tort
litigation is likely to have a material effect; (3) if past corporate environmental
practices by the registrant make it reasonably likely that remediation for those
practices is necessary; and (4) if the registrant is connected with a facility at which
cleanup activities may impose potential liability. See Archer et al., supra, at 10,108.
Although the SEC has stated that designation as a PRP by the EPA under CERCLA
"does not in and of itself trigger disclosure,.., a registrant's particular circumstanc-
es, when coupled with PRP status, may provide that knowledge." MD&A Release,
supra, at 22,430 n.30.
Thus, negligence in failing to disclose or in improperly disclosing the potential
environmental liabilities of the corporation in a registration statement will result in
personal civil liability of corporate directors and signing officers under § 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 77k (1988). The SEC does not, however,
provide specific standards for investigation or exact quantification of the liability. See
e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Tracking Environmental Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1991, at
F13 (reporting that although the SEC warned companies in 1989 to disclose any
potential environmental liabilities under CERCLA, the SEC still "'rel[ies] strongly on
the company's own opinion of materiality. So most of the [10-K liability disclosures]
do not disclose very much.'" (quotingAnthonyJ. Buonicore)). Additionally, the EPA
and the SEC have an informal arrangement whereby the EPA provides the
commission with names of companies receiving PRP letters and other information on
pending cases and complaints. See Conference Report: Environmental Issues Seen as
Having Ever- Widening Impact on Corporate America, 5 B.N.A.'s CoRP. COUNS. WEEKLY
6 (spec. supp.June 20, 1990) (statement of William E. Morley, associate director of
SEC's Division of Corporate Finance).
Although § 11 is a potential source of personal liability for D&Os, § 11 damages
are limited to a maximum recovery equal to the price at which the securities were
offered to the public. See Securities Act of 1933, §33, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e), (g) (1988).
These compensatory damages may be minor compared to the potential long-range
costs of the underlying environmental damages. They are, nevertheless, a potential
liability for the entire board, including the outside directors.
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Let us then consider the normal situation of a director who has
made a good faith environmental decision, such as deciding to use
the best available means for containing and disposing of hazardous
wastes. Under the business judgment rule, the director would
expect that if the best available means accord with industry
standards and GERCLA liability results regardless of those best
available means, he will still be protected from shareholder suits.
Therefore, although a director is not liable to the corporate
shareholders for the corporation's share of the costs, he may have
strict personal liability to the government for cleanup costs
regardless of the standard of care used by the director.72 Such a
result makes sense, for unlike the government, the shareholders
have, in theory, assumed the risk that management decisions may
result in losses to the corporation.
73
That the director's best-available-means environmental decision
is not protected from CERCLA liability by a rule similar to the
business judgment rule would not normally be a problem because
he is normally protected from derivative liability by common law
limited liability standards. 74  Courts, however, have removed
limited liability protection by finding individual liability for
corporate managers to be a necessary means of accomplishing the
congressional intent behind CERCLA. 75  Additional indirectly
72 See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891) (stating that with respect to
the corporation, the director is bound to the degree of care of an "ordinarily prudent
and diligent m[a]n ... under similar conditions," taking into account usages of
business); see also KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 39, § 1.14 (stating that the liability
of corporate D&Os to indemnify their corporation is not based on any concept of
comparative negligence, but on the wrong that caused the injury and the nature of
the legal obligation (citing Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 77 A.2d 368 (Pa. 1951))).75 Therefore, although the business judgment rule may be of little help to
directors in avoiding personal liability to the government for cleanup costs, it is at
least of some benefit in defending against shareholder suits that may arise over
corporate liability for CERCLA expenses. This protection against shareholder suits
is particularly important if D&O liability insurance policy claims are to be a
reasonable view of reality: according to a Wyatt Company survey of D&O insurance,
shareholders were the single largest source of D&O policy claims. See THE WYATT
COMPANY, 1989 WYATr DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY 37-38 (1989); cf
Julie J. Bisceglia, Comment, Practical Aspects of Directors' and Officers' Liability
Insurance-Allocating and AdvancingLegal Fees and the Duty to Defend, 32 UCLA L. REV.
690,692 (1985) (stating"claims covered by this [D&O] policy resemble plane crashes,
infrequent but devastating"). But cf. THE WYATT COMPANY, 1988 WYATT DIMEcToRs
AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY 25,27 (1988) (finding that only .1% of claims during
the period 1979-1987 were environmental and that no environmental claims appear
to have been initiated by shareholders).
74 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
7' See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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related problems, such as securities regulations, which require
reporting of potential environmental problems, further increase this
individual risk.76 If courts do not restore common law protection
to D&Os' decisions, such as business judgment rule presumptions,
the risk of increased exposure to personal blame and decreased
personal protection will cause managers-who are least likely to be
able to shift the burden of risk7 7 -to "fail conservative," avoiding
personal liability by refusing to take risks, even to the detriment of
corporate profitability and success.7 8
II. THE UNCERTAIN RESULTS OF STATE LEGISLATiVE ATTEMPTs TO
LIMIT THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
There are three possible responses to D&O liability under
CERCLA: (1) D&Os can refuse to make decisions entailing personal
risk of environmental liability, (2) legislatures can provide additional
statutory protection against personal D&O liability, or (3) the
market can respond by shifting the risk of personal loss to the
beneficiaries of the risk.
The individual response by D&Os will not work if the risk of
pollution liability is universal and absolute, and there are strong
grounds to believe this is substantially true.7 9 The legislative
response will work only if it really removes the risk from the
individual. State legislatures have a definite interest in protecting
corporate decision-makers. Corporate D&Os will seek to do
business in states where their personal interests are best protected.
Thus, states must respond by doing all they can to restore confi-
dence, or risk losing qualified corporate managers (or entire
corporations) to states providing more favorable treatment of
corporate decision-makers. 80  This part addresses the legislative
response alternative; the market response alternative is addressed
in part III.
76 See supra note 71.
77 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 116.
71 See Sara R. Slaughter, Note, Statutoy and Non-Statutoiy Responses to the Director
and Officer Liability Insurance Crisis, 63 IND. L.J. 181, 185 (1987) (arguing that if no
indemnification or insurance is available, directors may avoid all risks).
79 See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
80 See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 39, § 7.01 (discussing legislative efforts in
Delaware and Ohio to limit liability of corporate directors).
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A. State Statutory Limits on Liability
CERCLA should not preempt state statutory limitations on
individual director liability. Many state legislatures have responded
to past changes in personal liability exposure by enacting statutes
that allow or mandate corporate limitation of the personal liability
of directors. 81 A few state statutes even go so far as to protect the
liability of directors who have exercised a statutorily defined
standard of conduct.8 2 For example, section 309 of California's
Corporations Code states that a director who performs his duties in
good faith, as he believes to be in the corporation's best interests,
"and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use under similar circum-
stances.., shall have no liability based upon any alleged failure to
discharge [his] obligations as a director."8 3 Such a statute creates
a potential conflict between state law and federal common law
regarding director liability under CERCLA.
81 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.480 (1990); 1990 ARIZ. LEGIS. SERV. 10-054(A)(9)
(West); CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10) (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-101(2)
(1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54(2)
(Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) (1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 450.1209(c) (1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-202(2)(v) (1989); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 78.037(1) (Michie 1991); N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A:2-7(3) (Supp. 1991); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (1990
& Supp. 1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 60.047(2)(c) (1988 & Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 7-1.1-48(a)(6) (1985 & Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-2-102(e) (Law. Co-op.
1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49.1 (Supp. 1991); WASH. REv. CODE § 23B.08.320
(1990); WIS. STAT. § 180.0828 (1991).
Notably, however, while most state statutes protect directors, they do not extend
their coverage to officers. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 cmt. (West 1990); see also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1990) (including directors, but not specifically
including officers under its coverage); Gilchrist Sparks III, Delaware's D&O Liability
Law: Other States Should Follow Sui LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 18, 1986, at 10 (stating that
the drafters did not feel "that the increased perception of risk of personal liability...
[was] sufficient to cause officers, who depend upon a corporation for their livelihood,
to resign or refuse to serve"); Slaughter, supra note 78, at 186-90 (discussing the
Delaware statute and how it has been followed in many states). In such cases, the
individual officer's only protection is D&O liability insurance, and even insurance may
not provide protection for environmental decisions. See infra notes 101-67 and
accompanying text (discussing D&O liability insurance).
82 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1990)
(preventing liability without proof that director acted with deliberate intent or
reckless disregard); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41(D) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989)
(preventing liability from any claims or damages if director acted in good faith, with
ordinary care, and in reliance upon written opinion of an attorney for the corpora-
tion).
83 CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a), (c) (West 1990).
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Courts have held that "federal common law rather than state law
determines the availability of an action for contribution against
parties that are liable under CERCLA." 4 However, the cases in
which this issue has arisen do not provide precedent for situations
where an individual director is charged with derivative CERCLA
liability and statutory limits of individual liability exist. Careful
analysis of cases commonly cited to support strict liability of
individual directors reveals that more than owner or operator status
is actually considered in finding strict individual liability; personal
participation in the pollution activity falling below a due care
standard is the primary consideration.
8 5
Thus, the same cases that are primarily used by the courts to
support a finding of strict individual liability under the federal
environmental laws,8 6 can also be used in contrast to support the
effectiveness of a state statutory limitation on liability for decisions
meeting a statutory standard of due care.87 The result, that
directors are protected from individual liability in states where such
statutory protection exist, reflects the belief that directors should
not be guarantors of the corporation when an established standard
of conduct is observed.88
84 Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 657-58
(N.D. Ill.) (citing, inter alia, Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1488-89
(D. Colo. 1985) and United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808-09
(S.D. Ohio 1983)), aftd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
" See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d
726,729-30,743-45 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that though the directorwas strictlyliable
his omissions in determining or influencing the control of hazardous waste disposal
would probably not meet a due care standard), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1039, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding
director strictly liable, but also citing evidence showing efforts to abate pollution not
likely to meet a due care standard). See generally Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727
F. Supp. 1554, 1562 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (articulating a due care standard based on a
degree of authority and responsibility undertaken to determine "whether the
individual in a close corporation could have prevented or significantly abated the
release of hazardous substance[s]").
86 See supra note 3.
87 This approach would provide an additional incentive for federal courts to follow
the fact-specific "prevention test" initiated by the District Court for the Western
District of Michigan in Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. 1554, and Kelley ex rel. Michigan
Natural Resources Commission v. ARCO Industries Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D.
Mich. 1989), discussed above. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
I Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,84 (1975) (refusing to create a federal private right
of action for allegedly illegal corporate campaign contributions and holding that
"[c]orporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to
corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly
requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will
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Additionally, at least four courts have ruled on the question of
CERCLA preemption of state corporation laws. 89 The decisions
are split on whether the federal policy behind CERCLA is intended
to hold parties liable under CEROLA, even if liability for cleanup
costs is in conflict with state capacity statutes. 90 This important
question was recently denied review by the United States Supreme
Court following the Eighth Circuit's rejection of the argument that
preemption of state laws by CERCLA is essential to ensure that
liable parties do not use state corporation laws as a shield. 91 It is
therefore probable that in a state where the statutory standard of
conduct for corporate directors requires gross negligence or
recklessness for personal liability,92 a suit for CERCLA damages
against an individual corporate director will not be sustained based
purely on derivative strict liability.
93
govern the internal affairs of the corporation").
89 See Onan Corp. v. Industrial Steel Corp., No. 89-5387 (8th Cir. June 5, 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 431 (1990); Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co.,
817 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that CERCLA does not preempt state
capacity statutes); Columbia River Serv. Corp. v. Gilman, 751 F. Supp. 1448, 1453
(W.D. Wash. 1990) (holding that CERCLA does not preempt state law in determining
capacity to be sued); United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492, 1498 (D.
Utah 1987) (holding that CERCLA preempts state capacity statute). The Eighth
Circuit held, in Onan Corp., that CERCLA does not preempt state capacity statutes.
See Gilman, 751 F. Supp. at 1450 (discussing the unreported Onan Corp. decision).
9o See Gilman, 751 F. Supp at 1450-53 (surveying state and federal decisions on
whether CERCLA preempts state statutes).
91 See High Court Presented With Pre-Emption Case Raising CERCLA Liability For
Dissolved Firm, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1178 (Oct. 19, 1990) (reporting on the history of
Onan Corp.).
92 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (discussing some statutory
standards).
93 As was discussed above, environmental decisions, specifically those resulting in
CERCLA response costs, may result in securities law liabilities as well. See supra note
71. Negligence with regard to a statement concerning environmental actions in a
securities statement would not be protected from federally mandated liability by state
corporate law. See 15 U.S.C. § 791(1988). The SEC has determined that indemnifica-
tion is against the public policy expressed by the Securities Act of 1933. See Securities
Act Release No. 3519, [1952-56 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,312
(Oct. 11, 1954), as amended by Securities Act Release No. 3536, [1952-56 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 76,334 (Mar. 10, 1955). Courts have agreed that
federal law preempts state law in refusing to recognize a right to indemnification for
violations of federal securities regulations. See Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles &
Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1108 (4th Cir. 1989).
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B. State Indemnification Statutes
The statutory limitations on corporate directors' liability,
discussed above, exist only in a few states. 94 Most states' corpora-
tion laws provide only permissive protection, which allow their
corporations-competing in the marketplace for corporate manag-
ers-to decide whether or not to provide management with indemni-
fication provisions in the corporate charter or bylaws. 95 Further-
more, such statutes are unlikely to address (let alone provide for)
corporate indemnification of a director's or an officer's96 personal
liability to the federal government or other third parties. 97  A
director or officer in such states is, therefore, probably not required
to be indemnified by his corporation for personal CERCLA liability
to the federal government.
Additionally, the lack of business judgment rule protection for
D&Os from personal liability for CERCLA cleanup costs means
D&Os are most likely to be held personally accountable to the
federal government in the very area in which they are least likely to
enjoy indemnification. Though the benefits D&Os receive may
reflect their risks of liability, few individuals can afford the costs of
litigation and cleanup associated with CERCLA liability, regardless
of salary, compensation, and other prerogatives. In addition, the
argument that D&Os should be personally accountable to the
government as "operators" of the corporation seems prejudicial
against the management role. The corporation is operated for the
benefit of the shareholder-owners who enjoy the statutory protec-
tion of CERCLA's exclusion of persons holding "indicia of owner-
ship, .... without participating in the management of a facility."
9 8
Thus, by the interaction of environmental and corporate statutes,
D&Os retain a significant risk of personal liability with no statutory
requirement for corporate indemnification of such liability.
Statutory indemnity will not entirely remedy the dilemma of
personal risk if interim funding of litigation and expenses is only
94 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
95 See BLOCK ET AL,., supra note 27, at 567-68.
96 Indeed, officers may not even be addressed by indemnification statutes. See
supra note 81.
97 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1990) (addressing only "liability
... to the corporation or its stockholders"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0831 (West Supp.
1991) (limiting liability "to the corporation or any other person" only); WIs. STAT.
§ 180.0828(1) (1991) (same).
98 CERCLA, § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
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permissive under the statute. 99 When interim funding is not
specifically mandated in the corporate by-laws, the burden of
advancing the costs of litigation and expenses may fall on the
individual, who may not be repaid under the indemnity contract
until entry of a final favorable ruling.10 0 This burden treats the
individual as a wrongdoer until her acts have been legally vindicat-
ed.
The purpose of CERCLA is to ensure compensation of the
government and private groups for the cost of hazardous waste
cleanup, not to punish decision-makers for past actions that violate
current standards. 10 1 There is, therefore, no public policy reason
for forcing a corporate director or officer to bear the burden of
proving that her actions warrant indemnification. D&Os who
commit clearly wrongful acts should expect no protection, 10 2 but
where liability is strict and retroactive the line between right and
wrong is blurred. This lack of a "bright line" standard makes it
inequitable to force an individual to bear the burden of defending
her good faith/best judgment risks taken for the benefit of the
corporation and its shareholder-owners until, through vindication,
indemnification is warranted.
The risk of personal liability for corporate D&Os can be partially
remedied if, when using good faith and their best judgment in
making decisions, D&Os are protected from personal liability for
unforeseen or unappreciated risks until the reasonableness of their
decisions is disproved. Statutory indemnification does not provide
such protection. Individual liability insurance coverage could
provide this protection as a market response to the uncertainties of
indemnification and the burden of GERCLA interim costs, but for
insurance to be an effective market tool, courts must keep the
99 For examples of statutes in which interim funding of litigation and expenses is
only permissive, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (Supp. 1990); IND. CODE § 23-1-
37-8(a) (1989); NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.751(4) (1986 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 723(c) (McKinney Supp. 1991); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512 (1990); Wis.
STAT. § 180.046 (1991).
100 See 11 GEORGE J. COUCH ET AL., COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
§ 44:4 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing distinction between liability and indemnity coverage);
3A FLETCHER, supra note 49, § 13,14 (perm. ed. rev. 1986) (noting indemnification
payments cannot be made until after the court has made a final determination).
1 See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,
733 (8th Cir. 1986) (disagreeing with the argument that CERCLA creates a new form
of liability designed to deter and punish past acts under current standards), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
102 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
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nature of the negotiated risk in mind when they analyze what was
bargained for in the D&O policy. Unfortunately, as part III will
show, the courts have either not realized the nature of the negotiat-
ed risk or have gotten their analysis of D&O liability policy coverage
wrong in attempting to cover the negotiated risk.
I. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY INSURANCE AND INDIVIDUAL
CERCLA LIABiLrrY: JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
IN THE INSURANCE MARKET
A. The Need for Liability Insurance
The purpose of the first two parts of this Comment was to show
that under the current state of the law D&Os remain vulnerable to
CEROLA's provisions imposing strict and retroactive liability for
unforeseen and inappreciable risks. Numerous externalities exist
which can transform reasonable business decisions, taken in good
faith, into wrongful acts of environmental contamination. States
have generally attempted to reduce the exposure of D&Os to
personal risk with statutory limits on liability and statutory indemni-
fication. Federal court decisions finding that state corporation laws
are not preempted by CEROLA's liability provisions indicatejudicial
support for state statutory limitations on D&O liability.1 03  In
those states, however, where permissive indemnification is the only
protection for D&Os from CERCLA liability, the statutory protec-
tion is incomplete.
Incomplete protection means that there is a substantial risk of
personal liability for D&Os. Market measures are therefore
necessary to compensate for this lack of protection. Pollution
liability insurance is one such market mechanism.10 4 Liability
insurance requires that the insurer provide coverage once a liability
has been established; the fact that the insured has not yet suffered
any loss is immaterial.1 05 Liability insurance, therefore, insulates
D&Os from the cost of personally warranting their actions and thus
approaches a better remedy than statutory indemnification.
D&O liability insurance (either through a commercial carrier or
private self-insurance) shifts the burden of risks taken in good faith
103 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
104 See MARTIN T. KATzMAN, CHEMICAL CATASTROPHIES: REGULATING ENVIRON-
MENTAL RISK THROUGH POLLUTION LIABILITY INSURANCE 151-58 (1985).
105 See 11 COUCH ET AL., supra note 100, § 44:4.
264 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:241
and using best judgment back to the real beneficiary of the risks,
the shareholder-owners. Insurance coverage forces the shareholders
to convert potential returns into insurance premium payments.
106
Shareholders may respond to this shifting of the risk by arguing that
the threat of individual liability can be shown to have a very real
effect on the decision-maker who is potentially exposed to personal
loss,107 and by thus shifting the risk of personal loss away from
management, standards of managerial conduct will diminish.0
Nevertheless, when D&Os are acting for the corporation the
business judgment rule requirements (which protect against the
more real threat of shareholder suits) 1' should maintain a mini-
mum standard of management conduct.
B. Judicial Disregard for the Justification Behind D&O Liability Policies
Statutory limitations on liability represent a public policy that
D&Os should not be personally liable for corporate acts taken in
good faith and using reasonable judgment. 10 D&O liability
insurance represents a similar market response to such liability by
providing insurance for the risk associated with business decisions
that result in personal liability. However, such a market mechanism
can be effective only if courts correctly analyze the insurance
agreement and the intentions of the parties creating the agreement.
A D&O liability insurance policy comes in two parts. One part
provides insurance directly to the individual; the other part provides
reimbursement to the corporation for executive indemnification.
The individual insurance coverage and the corporate indemnifica-
tion insurance coverage are always provided by the same D&O
liability insurance policy."' Although the overall policy is titled
106 Alternatively, the corporation may choose to self-insure and spread such risks
through risk pools or captive insurers, or simply choose to absorb the loss. See BLOCK
ET AL., supra note 27, at 619.
107 This was especially obvious during the D&O liability insurance crisis of 1986.
See Slaughter, supra note 78, at 184-85 (reporting incidents of directors resigning
when insurance ended).
108 See JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS:
INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 1.04 (1982).
109 See supra note 27.
110 See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 27, at 482-83.
111 For examples of current D&O policies provided by the two leading carriers,
see Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, Executive Liability and Indemnification
Policy, Chubb Form 14-02-0386 (Ed. 2-84) (1984) [hereinafter "Chubb Policy"], and
National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa., Directors and Officers
Insurance and Company Reimbursement Policy, National Union Forms 47352 &
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a "liability" policy, there is disagreement as to whether the insur-
ance policy really provides liability insurance. Since the corporation
reimbursement part of the policy provides indemnification coverage
to the corporation, insurers argue that the entire policy (including
the individual insurance part) is an indemnity policy. 112 This
argument does not reflect the obvious intent of the D&O insureds
in seeking D&O liability insurance for personal liability.118 The
D&O insureds are primarily interested in creating a liability policy
that avoids the personal expenses associated with indemnification.
Remembering the problems associated with the common law
and state indemnification statutes which justify D&O liability
insurance as a supplemental market measure,1 14 the reason for
the bifurcation of D&O liability policies seems plain. As was
discussed in part II, indemnification is an imperfect guarantee of
personal risk.115 The corporate indemnification portion of the
policy reimburses the insured corporation for this partial protection
of D&Os permitted by indemnification statutes. If D&O liability
insurance is to be a market response to the partial protection of
indemnification, the individual insurance portion of the policy must
exist to alleviate the remaining financial burdens associated with
indemnification: the costs of litigation and CERCLA response costs
incurred prior to a favorable ruling.
116
1. Facile Construction of D&O Policies Disregarding the
Market Role of Insurance
Regardless of the inherent nature of insurance as a market
response and the plain purpose of D&O liability insurance as
manifested by the bifurcated policy, courts have used other
reasoning in their determinations of whether a D&O policy provides
47353 (1988) [hereinafter "National Union Policy"] (on file with the author).
112 The insurance carrier prefers that the policy be an indemnity policy, because
the burden is then upon the insured to prove the wrongful act is covered by the
policy.
pl An important concern for the individual D&Os in performing a personal risk
analysis of their decisions is whether their D&O liability policy provides liability or
indemnity coverage. See, e.g., Bisceglia, supra note 73, at 691 (discussing the practical
effect of the difference between indemnity and liability policies for D&Os).
I
4 Seesupra notes 95-102 and accompanying text (discussing state indemnification
statutes).115 See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
116 For a discussion of response costs that may be incurred before a favorable
ruling, see infra note 139.
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liability coverage. The first and far more superficial approach is to
simply look at the title and the loss provisions of the policy. Such
a determination has little support because it disregards the policy
as a whole. 117 A better approach is to look at the entire policy as
well as the market need to which the insurance policy is responding.
Armed with both the negotiated terms of the policy and the parties'
primary purposes, courts can then resolve policy ambiguities that
manifest the distinct expectations of the parties to the insurance
agreement.1 18 Ambiguities contrary to the intentions of the
insureds should be resolved in favor of liability coverage.
119
Generally, however, judicial analyses fail to consider both the
entirety of the D&O policy and its purpose in providing reasons for
finding liability or indemnity coverage.
The fault, however, may not lie with the court, but with the
insureds. Insureds continue to make the ipse dixit argument that
D&O policies are customary liability policies because the title-
regardless of the market uncertainty driving D&Os to seek liability
insurance and the entire policy contents-labels the policy as a
"liability" policy.' 20  Carriers correctly argue that their actual
intention is to provide indemnity coverage. 12 1 Fortunately for the
insureds making the ipse dixit argument, several courts have
endorsed their reasoning (or lack thereof).1 22 Little v. MGIC
117 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1979) (stating contractual
terms are to be interpreted in such a way that they are given a "reasonable, lawful,
and effective meaning," over an "unreasonable, unlawful" or ineffective meaning).
Certainly, the title of a policy-a "liability" policy-if merely a customary way of
referring to such a policy is standardized language and courts should look more
carefully at the contents of the policy.
118 See id. § 202(1) (stating that the primary purpose of the parties, if ascertain-
able, should be given great weight). Itis arguable that the "liability" title indicates the
primary purpose of the parties is to create a liability policy.
119 See id. § 206 (stating that ambiguous terms shall generally be construed against
the drafter).
120 Compare Zaborac v. American Casualty Co., 663 F. Supp. 330, 332 (C.D. Ill.
1987) (finding the policy was an indemnification policy and stating "the [insurer's]
obligations do not accrue until the loss suffered by the insured can be ultimately
determined, which is at the time the underlying claims are adjudicated or settled")
with FSLIC v. Burdette, 718 F. Supp. 649, 661 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (noting that
insurance policies must be read as a whole and determining that, based on the title
of the policy and its loss provisions, the policy was a liability policy). See generally 11
COUCH ET AL., supra note 100, § 44:4 (distinguishing indemnity and liability
insurance); ROBERT E. KEETON, B,%sIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 4.8(a) (1971) (stat-
ing that liability insurance protects the insured against loss caused by his tort liability
to a third person).
121 See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 39, § 21.08 (D&O insurance policies "are,
and always have been intended to be, 'indemnity' or reimbursement policies").
122 In Okada v. MGIC Indemnity Corp., 823 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth
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Indemnity Corp.123 provides a good example of judicial analysis
along these lines:
We begin by noting that, as its title plainly indicates, the policy is
a liability policy rather than an indemnity policy .... The language
of [the loss provision] is entirely consistent with the characteriza-
tion of the policy as a liability policy. A "loss" is defined as an
amount that the insured is "legally obligated to pay." Although
this section does not explicitly speak to the timing of the insurer's
duty to pay, the only reasonable interpretation is that this duty
arises at the time the insured becomes "legally obligated to
pay."
124
The court's reasoning is tautological. The court looks only to the
title and the loss provisions of the policy. In order to find that to
be the "only reasonable interpretation," the policy must be read as
a liability policy in the first place. Because the policy is silent as to
timing, the court should have looked elsewhere in the policy, and
if that was not sufficient, to the purposes of the policy as a whole.
Treating a policy as a liability policy simply because of the name
on the title page and a facile reading of the loss provision fails to
consider the intentions of the parties to the agreement. Such an
approach only manifests ajudicial preference for insurers to pay the
costs of litigation as they are incurred, regardless of whether such
an obligation is intended.
Furthermore, such an analysis is not a persuasive foundation on
which to support future decisions. It is too easy for insurers to
point at such decisions as gestures ofjudicial activism by the courts.
Judicially shifting cleanup costs to the insurer in such a cursory
manner only shifts the potential absolute liability to the insurer
without regard to whether that is the purpose of the agreement.
Therefore, superficialjudicial construction of insurance agreements
manifests an inequitable treatment of insureds and insurers, and
places the highly correlated risk of environmental liability on the
insurer.125 This partiality for a perfunctory construction of the
Circuit found the policy at issue ambiguous as to time of payment. The court
reasoned that the policy was by default a liability policy (not indemnification) and
thus provided coverage for losses that the insureds were legally obligated to pay as
they were incurred. See id. at 280; see also PepsiCo v. Continental Casualty Co., 640
F. Supp. 656, 659-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that absent a factual basis showing no
possible obligation to indemnify, insurer had an obligation to pay D&Os' defense
costs as costs were incurred).
123 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987).
124 Id. at 793.
125 See generally Priest, supra note 19, at 1544-48 (discussing the necessity, in
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insurance agreement cannot be cured by better policy drafting, but
only by the loss of insurance availability.
126
2. Failure of Judicial Analysis of Policy Wording to Consider the
Market Role of D&O Liability Insurance
Besides determining whether a D&O policy was meant to be a
liability policy or an indemnification policy, courts must also
determine whether the requirements for coverage 127 are met by
CERCLA potential liability notice. Five requirements must be met
to find D&O liability coverage. First, there must be loss and a legal
obligation to pay. Second, there must be no indemnification by the
corporation. Third, there must be a wrongful act actually commit-
ted or attempted, or allegedly committed or attempted before or
during the policy period. Fourth, the claim must be made against
the insured during the policy period (or some extended peri-
od).1 28 And finally, the loss must not be the result of a claim
arising from circumstances excluded under the insurance policy's
exclusions.
129
proper insurance market operation, for independent individual risks). "Sodo-legal
risks," such as the risk of the courts relaxing legal standards, are highly correlated and
not independent. See id. at 1544; see also Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role
of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 536 (1984) (noting
that "socio-legal" risks may destroy the insurer's ability to predict loss distribution
with accuracy). Therefore, presentjudicial interpretations of D&O insurance policies
favoring liability coverage for insureds prevent insurers from realizing the compara-
tive advantages of aggregating a class of independent risks.
126 Cf Priest, supra note 19, at 1572 n.198 (stating that "[t]he complete withdrawal
of insurers from day-care coverage is strong evidence that judicial efforts to force
coverage of uninsurable risks ... are short-sighted, reducing effective insurance
levels").
127 For, even if liability coverage is found using heuristic reasoning that addresses
the purposes and drafting of the entire policy, liability coverage does not exist for all
potential liabilities.
128 For example, under the Chubb Policy:
The [insurer] shall pay on behalf of each of the Insured Persons all Loss for
which the Insured Person is not indemnified by the Insured Organization
and which the Insured Person becomes legally obligated to pay on account
of any claim first made against him, individually or otherwise, during the
Policy Period or, if exercised, during the Extended Reporting Period for a
Wrongful Act committed, attempted, or allegedly committed or attempted,
by the Insured Person(s) before or during the Policy Period.
Chubb Policy, supra note 111, c. 1.1 (emphasis omitted); see also National Union
Policy, supra note 111, Form 47353, cI. 1 (requiring essentially the same events to
occur).
129 Common policy exclusions include regulatory exclusions, insurer versus
insured exclusions, pollution exclusions, securities exclusions, and property damage
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In determining whether an environmental liability requires
coverage by a D&O liability policy, the first question is: has there
been a loss under the terms of the policy. "Loss" is a term of art
that is defined in the policy."3 ' Typically, it is defined as "damag;
es, judgments, settlements and Defense Costs ... incurred in the
defense of actions, suits or proceedings and appeals therefrom;...
[l]oss shall not include civil or criminal fines or penalties imposed
by law."13 1 Losses deliberately caused by the insured are outside
the concept of risk, implying that there must be some quality of
uncertainty to the loss-generating event.1 32 The second require-
ment, that there be no indemnification by the corporation, prevents
double recovery by the insured D&Os and double payment by the
insurer. Since all D&O liability policies contain corporate indemni-
fication policies, double recovery would occur if the insurer
reimbursed the corporation and provided liability coverage to the
individual. The third requirement, that there be a "wrongful act"
by the insured before or during the policy period, prevents an
insured from claiming a loss for an act or alleged act that is done
after the insured is no longer hovered by the agreement. Such a
requirement limits the duration of the coverage.
The most important aspect of liability insurance is the extent of
the losses that it covers. Liability insurance provides that in
addition to liability for damages (for example, response costs),
defense costs will be treated by courts as losses.13 3  Indeed, in
some policies the coverage of defense costs under the terms and
or bodily injury exclusions. See National Union Policy, supra note 111, Form 47353,
cl. 4; see also infra notes 147-70 and accompanying text (discussing the pollution
exclusion in detail).130 See Gilliam v. American Casualty Co., 735 F. Supp. 345,351 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
1 See National Union Policy, supra note 111, Form 47353, el. 2(b) (stating that
"'Defense Costs' means reasonable and necessary fees, costs and expenses consented
to by the Insurer ... resulting solely from ... any claim against the Insureds"
(emphasis added)).
MP2 See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 39, § 21.07 (stating that losses are "distinctly
different from the underlying 'Wrongful Acts' for which directors or officers may be
liable"). Furthermore, it has been held that the insurer of a D&O liability policy is
only liable for losses, and not for the underlying "wrongful acts" for which D&Os may
be liable. See Gilliam, 735 F. Supp. at 352.
15" See Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 823 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1986) (conclud-
ing that language stating that loss included "defense of legal actions, claims or
proceedings and appeals therefrom," which the insured "directors are legally
obligated to pay" supported a duty by the insurer to pay legal expenses as they were
incurred); see also Pacific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating
that "an insurance company is obligated to defend an insured whenever the complaint
filed by the injured party may potentially come within the policy's coverage").
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conditions of the policy is presumed.1 34 Immediate defense costs
include discovery costs in determining the identities of other PRPs
who should be joined, environmental consultation to determine the
most cost-effective cleanup plan for a site, and legal costs associated
with negotiations with the EPA. There is a possibility that such
costs may not be covered by statutory or contractual indemnity.
1 3 5
Liability coverage of defense costs relieves D&Os of a substantial
financial burden not provided by indemnity insurance. Once an
insurer's obligation to provide financial coverage is triggered by a
claim made during the policy period and the loss is potentially
covered by the policy agreement, the insurer has the obligation of
paying defense costs as they are incurred.
13 6
a. Inability of D&O Liability Insurance to Work as an Effective Market
Tool Arising from Judicial Failure to Regard EPA Notification of Insureds
as an Event Triggering Coverage
The fourth requirement, that a claim must be made against the
insured during the policy period, is especially important in CEROLA
claims. Whether a PRP notice of liability is a claim that triggers a
loss is important because D&O liability insurance is "claims-made."
Claims-made policies require that a claim be made during the policy
period.1 37  To determine the effect of a PRP notice one must
" See National Union Policy, supra note 111, Form 47353, d. 1, Coverage A &
c. 9 (requiring the insurer to advance to each and every D&O the defense costs of
claims prior to their final disposition and that such advance payments be repaid by
the insureds, "severally according to their respective interests," in the event they are
not entitled to the coverage under the terms and conditions of the policy).
13 5 See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
136 See Chubb Policy, supra note 111, ds. 6.1-6.3 (requiring that consent to
advancement of defense costs not be "unreasonably" withheld); see also Gon v. First
State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that although D&O liability
policies generally require no duty to defend, the absence of a duty to defend is not
crucial because D&O liability policies impose upon insurers a duty to pay defense
expenses as incurred); Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 794-95 (3d Cir.
1987) (finding that unless a duty to pay defense costs as they are incurred is explicitly
negated by a D&O liability policy, the policy must be construed against the insurer
as providing such a duty).
137 Under a claims-made insurance policy:
[T]he insurer agrees to assume liability for acts or omissions of the type
covered by the policy regardless of when they occurred, if (1) the claim
arising out of the act or omission was made during the policy period, or (2)
notice was given to the insurer within the policy period as to an occurrence
which may subsequently give rise to a claim.... This is compared to an
occurrence policy, which covers acts or omissions occurring during the
policy period regardless of when the subsequent claim is filed.
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know that CERCLA requires mandatory responses for which the
EPA, or any other responding party, recover its response costs.
13 8
The mandatory responses include short-term or "removal" costs for
a spill or sudden leak and long-term or "remedial" costs in situa-
tions where the site requires a full-blown cleanup.13 9 A response
is always initiated by notification advising PRPs of 'their legal
obligation to pay for a claim (such as conducting an Remedial
Investigation and Feasibility Study) or for a wrongful act (some
FSLIC v. Burdette, 718 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 & n.2 (E.D. Tenn. 1989). The term
"claim," when used in a D&O liability policy, is a term of art. See, e.g., Winkler v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that where
a policy "draws a distinction between claims actually made and those threatened, the
latter cannot possibly be construed as a 'claim'"); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Home State
Say. Ass'n, 797 F.2d 285, 288 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that "[a]lthough 'claim' often
means 'contention,' that is not the use to which it has been put in [a D&O liability
insurance] agreement" and the only claim that actually triggers "the insurer's
obligation to pay would be a demand for payment of some amount of money"
(emphasis added)). However, courts do not necessarily follow such narrow definitions
when deciding D&O policy coverage. See, e.g., Polychron v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos.,
916 F.2d 461, 463 (8th Cir. 1990) (endorsing both the dictionary definition and a
reasonable construction of "claim" to find that a bank president's pre-indictment
defense costs constitute a covered "loss," even though his indictment occurred after
the policy period).
38 See CERCLA, § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). Persons who
can recover under § 107(a)(4)(B) include, among others, states, interstate bodies,
municipalities, and individuals. See id. § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
139 See id. § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (establishing a third alternative for
the EPA as "any other response measure consistent with the national contingency
plan which the President deems necessary"); id. § .107(a)(4)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A)(B) (allowing for the recovery of removal, remedial actions, and other
response costs); see also id. § 101(23)-(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(24) (defining
"removal" and "remedial action").
Ifa hazard is perceived as requiring remedial measures, PRPs may be informed
that a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) must be conducted, at
their expense, to assess the hazard and formulate a cleanup plan. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 300.425-.440 (1991); see also CERCLA, § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988)
(authorizing the EPA to offer PRPs the opportunity to clean up a site before the EPA
takes a response action). If the PRPs fail to conduct a RI/FS, the government will
perform the RI/FS and seek reimbursement from the PRPs. See id., §§ 104(a),
111(a)(1), 112(a), (c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9611(a)(1), 9612(a), (c). In a case where
the EPA performs the RI/FS, the actual response costs may not be generated until
years after the site is identified. See FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 656 (1990) (explaining that the EPA's process of
placing a site on the National Priority List, preparing an elaborate study of site
conditions and cleanup options, and negotiatingwith the PRPs may take two or more
years). Usually, the EPA will attempt to negotiate a consent decree under which the
PRPs can carry out the removal or cleanup. See id. If negotiations fail, the EPA can
mandate cleanup under an administrative order, sue to compel cleanup, or carry out
the cleanup and then negotiate or sue for response costs. See id.
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responsible relationship to the hazardous waste site under CERCLA)
and, thus, should meet the definition of a loss. 140 This assertion
finds support in Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corpora-
tion1 41 where the court denied that "a traditional lawsuit for
money damages" was needed to trigger coverage.1 42 The court
held that a "'suit' includes any effort to impose on the policyholders
a liability ultimately enforceable by a court."14 PRP notification
letters, especially those that threaten to join D&Os personally in an
action, entail a potential liability for the cost of an EPA approved
study. 44 Insureds can certainly show that PRP notification letters
consistently result in some legal obligation of the notified PRP and
140 See New York v. Blank, 745 F. Supp. 841, 852 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that
following EPA notice to PRP, "regardless of the date upon which the complaint was
actually filed, [the insurer] has an obligation to reimburse [the insured] for all defense
costs which he incurred for services rendered which are useful in defending against
the first-party complaint").
141 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
142 Id. at 75.
143 Id. But see Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. K88-124 CA4, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6724, at *24 (W.D. Mich. June 4, 1990) (concluding that the
Fireman's Fund decision is incorrect).
144 See, e.g., John Hancock Healthplan, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 88-2308,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11019, at *12-13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 1989) (holding that a
threat to join D&Os in an action against their corporation may be a claim).
Cases regarding Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy coverage have
been the primary forum for debating the effect of a PRP letter on triggering
coverage. See generally Carter Day Indus., Inc. v. EPA (In re Combustion Equip.
Assoc.), 73 B.R. 85, 87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that a PRP letter merely
advises an insured of a potential liability), afd, 838 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988). Since
most CGL policies require an actual suit to trigger coverage, while D&O policies may
require only a claim against an insured to trigger coverage, the standard for the
triggering of coverage may not be the same under both types of policies. There are
varied views on whether agency notice constitutes a "claim" or a "suit." Compare Mt.
Hawley Ins. Co. v. FSLIC, 695 F. Supp. 469, 479-80 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (finding that
letters from an administrative body imposing restrictions and threatening enforce-
ment action constituted a claim) and Fireman's Fund, 662 F. Supp. at 75 (stating that
"coverage does not hinge on the form of action taken or the nature of relief sought,
but on an actual or threatened use of legal process to coerce payment or conduct by a
policyholder" (emphasis added)) with California Union Ins. Co. v. American
Diversified Say. Bank, 914 F.2d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 1990) (disapproving of the Mt.
Hawley decision and interpreting the term "claim" not to include an agency's request
that the insured comply with regulations where the agency does not threaten liability),
cert. denied, I IIS. Ct. 966 (1991) and Bensalem Township v. Western World Ins. Co.,
609 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (finding "'notice [that it is a third party's]
intention to hold the insureds responsible for a Wrongful Act' is an event commonly
antecedent to and different in kindfrom a 'claim'"(quoting the insurance policy at
issue)).
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such notice should, therefore, be regarded as a coverage-triggering
event.
145
It is in the best interest of the PRP to negotiate a cost-effective
consent decree with the EPA for two reasons: first, to trigger a
claim under the claims-made policy (assuring the policy coverage is
not lost before a claim is finally made), and second, to minimize the
PRP's response costs.146 Assuming the insurer ultimately will be
liable for a portion of the final cost, an early consent decree would
be preferred by the insurer for the same reasons. However, if the
insurer can prevent the claim from being made during the duration
of the policy-thus avoiding coverage under a claims-made policy
altogether-the insurer will prefer to delay.
Considering the large costs potentially attributable to a single
loss, possibly the most significant criterion of CERCLA liability
coverage under a D&O liability policy is the requirement that the
loss not be incurred as a result of circumstances covered under a
policy's exclusions. Technically, there are a number of possibilities
in a standard policy for a carrier to use to deny coverage for
CERCLA liability. The foremost of these is the pollution exclusion;
for a truly effective pollution exclusion-providing it does not
contravene public policy-will exclude claims arising from civil,
criminal, or private actions connected with seepage, pollution, or
contamination. Such an exclusion will deny a director or officer the
liability insurance protection of the D&O liability policy by
preventing advancement of interim defense costs and consultation
costs as well as the ultimate remedial damages.
145 State and federal courts stand divided on this issue. See Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co.,
916 F.2d 731, 738 (1st Cir. 1990) (comparing various courts' decisions on whether a
PRP letter institutes a "suit"). For instance, a recent analysis of New York law
regarding the unsettled issue of whether liability insurance coverage is triggered by
a PRP letter found an "important common denominator: ... the proposition that,
to find agency conduct to trigger the duty to defend under New York law, there must
be some cognizable degree of coerciveness or adversariness in the administrative
body's actions." Id. at 737-38.146 See generally Thomas M. Hamilton & Eric L. Routman, Cleaning Up America:
Superfund and Its Impact on the Insurance Industy, 41 CPCUJ. 172, 175 (1988) (stating
that although CERCLA's National Contingency Plan requires that cost-effectiveness
be considered by the EPA in conducting a cleanup, statutory emphasis on permanent
solutions has overshadowed cost-effectiveness as a consideration).
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b. Judicial Avoidance of Whether a D&O Liability Policy is a True
Liability Policy Through Circumvention of the Pollution Exclusion
In the mid 1980s, insurers started adding significant exclusions
to their policies for claims arising from contests for corporate
control. 14 7  During this same period, the effects of the 1980
Superfund legislation were also beginning to be realized by insurers
as a number of financially responsible parties sought coverage under
Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policies. The legal
environment that developed out of CERCLA recovery actions-a
combination of unforeseeable risk1 48 and doctrinal instabil-
ity149-resulted in true uncertainty for insurers. 50 For example,
CGL policies that were purposely limited in their coverage to
"sudden and accidental" pollution incidents to avoid the costs of
intentional pollution or long-term releases, 15 1 resulted in courts
dividing on how to interpret those terms.
1 52
147 See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 27, at 603-06.
148.See KATZMAN, supra note 104, at 10 (stating that chemicals which themselves
maybe relatively harmless can combine with others in the environment and, through
a chain of chemical reactions, become a hazardous chemical); D'Arcy & Herricks,
supra note 18, at 74 (arguing that heterogeneous exposure units, indefinite damage
losses, unknown time when loss occurred, inexact determinability of contributors to
the loss, and moral hazard all combine to make hazardous waste actions a poor
subject of risk analysis).
149 See KATZMAN, supra note 104, at 78-79 (discussing the uncertainty of insurers
resulting from differences in common law liabilities among states and between statute
and common law, the effect ofjoint and several liability, and judicial willingness to
ignore pollution liability exclusions).
150 See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE LIABILITY
INSURANCE atv (1982) (finding that "[tihe major insurability problem under CERCLA
has to do with the particular combination of liability and financial responsibility
provisions which tend to render the liability exposure of the insurer too uncertain for
traditional underwriting practices"). SeegenerallyJohnA. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior
and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1820, 1832-33 (1987) (arguing
that unforeseen risk and changes in rules of liability are too unpredictable to set an
insurance premium based on projected future costs).
151 See Dan R. Anderson, Property Damage Liability CoverageforAsbestos Removal and
Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs, 42 CPCUJ. 8, 15 (1989) (discussing a typical pollution
exclusion).
152 See id. at 15-16 (listing cases favoring policyholders and discussing recent cases
holding in favor of insurers); Eugene R. Anderson & Avraham C. Moskowitz, How
Much Does the CGL Pollution Exclusion Really Exclude?, RISK MGMT., Apr. 1984, at 28,
36 (concluding the pollution exclusion only excludes deliberate pollutions intended
to cause injuries); Bruce H. Winkelman, Insurance Coverage Issues in Environmental
Pollution and Toxic Tort Litigation, 41 CPCUJ. 93, 98-100 (1988) (noting some recent
conflicting judicial interpretations).
1991] PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 275
The controversy of CGL policy pollution exclusions revolved
around either finding the exclusion ambiguous or interpreting the
exclusion quite narrowly.15 3  The reaction to judicial policy of
creating judge-made insurance contracts is evident in typical D&O
liability policy pollution exclusions.'M Consider, for example, the
following excerpt from one D&O policy:
[This policy excludes payment for loss connected with claims] for
seepage, pollution or contamination and based upon or attribut-
able to violation or alleged violation of any federal, state, munici-
pal or other governmental statute, regulation or ordinance
prohibiting or providing for the control or regulation of emissions
or effluents of any kind into the atmosphere or any body of land,
water, waterway or watercourse or arising from any action or
proceeding brought for enforcement purposes by any public
official, agency, commission, board or pollution control adminis-
tration pursuant to any such statutes, regulations, or ordinances or
arising from any claims alleging seepage, pollution or contamina-
tion based upon common law nuisance or trespass.
155
The exclusion, however, is narrow and potentially ambiguous,
and can be read in two ways. The first and most restrictive
interpretation reads the exclusion as precluding coverage in three
different situations: (1) for liability for contamination or pollution
release and based upon a violation of an environmental statute,
regulation or ordinance; or (2) for liability arising from any
enforcement action or proceeding brought by a public entity based
on environmental law; or (3) for liability arising from claims alleging
contamination or pollution release based upon common law trespass
or nuisance. The combined effect of this interpretation, finding
153 See Hamilton & Routman, supra note 146, at 183.
154 See DAN L. GoLDwAssER, DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE AND
SELF-INSURANCE 52 (1986) (stating that most D&O policies have exclusions applicable
to seepage, pollution, and contamination claims).
155 Chubb Policy, supra note 111, c. 3.1(d). Some policies may extend this
exclusion more broadly. See e.g., National Union Policy, supra note 111, Form 47353,
c. 4(j) (excluding loss based on claims "alleging, arising out of, based upon,
attributable to, or in any way involving, directly or indirectly: (1) the actual, alleged
or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants, or (2) any direction
or request to test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize
pollutants"). This National Union Policy exclusion is much broader than the one
contained in National Union's earlier policy. The earlier policy excluded only claims
"arising from charges of seepage, pollution, or contamination." National Union Fire
Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., Directors and Officers Insurance and Corporation
Reimbursement Policy, National Union Form 8749, cl. 4(m) & Form 8750, cl. 4(m)
(1985) (on file with author).
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three exclusions in one, but with only the first requiring a finding
of actual seepage, pollution, or contamination, is to preclude
coverage in the last two cases without an actual showing of contami-
nation or release. The result of such an interpretation would be
that insureds would be denied defense coverage associated with the
receipt of an EPA notification of intent to join individual officers or
directors as PRPs.
A second interpretation would combine the first criterion ("for
seepage, pollution or contamination") with each of the three
excluded events. It would provide an exclusion: (1) for liability for
contamination or pollution release and based upon a violation of a
statute, regulation, or ordinance; or (2) for liability for contamina-
tion or pollution release and arising from an enforcement action by
a public entity; or (3) for liability for contamination or pollution
release and arising from any claims alleging the same under
common law trespass or nuisance theories. The effect of this
interpretation would be to preclude D&O liability coverage only in
those cases where it is proven that seepage, pollution, or contamina-
tion actually occurred as a result of the insured's actions. The result
of such an interpretation would provide coverage of defense costs
for an insured receiving a PRP notice.
Since insurance contracts are prepared by the insurer's experts,
who are learned in the law of insurance, it is not unfair that the
insurer "bear the burden of any resulting confusion." 156 There-
fore ambiguities of insurance policies are to be "liberally construed
in favor of [the insured] and strictly construed, whenever possible,
against the insurer in order to afford the protection which the
insured was endeavoring to secure when he applied for the
insurance." 157 Accordingly, the second interpretation of a typical
D&O liability policy pollution exclusion would be the most
reasonable.
Thus, under the quoted policy, the advancement of defense
costs, though permissive only, shall not be withheld
unreasonably.1 58 The insurer must, therefore, provide defense
costs to the PRP insured until it is shown that the insured's actions
were the actual proximate cause of the seepage, pollution, or
156 Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947).
157 13 JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7401 (rev. ed. 1976
& Supp. 1990).
1 See supra note 136.
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contamination and that the CERCLA action is not based simply on
strict, joint, and several liability claims of a public or private entity
against one of many PRPs. In contrast, under another D&O policy,
even though the pollution exclusion is significantly more inclusive
than the exclusion just analyzed, 159 the Coverage Clause and a
related Defense Costs Clause effectively provide defense costs until
it is shown that the loss is excluded by the policy.160 Such a
policy would provide effectively the same protection in defending
against personal CERCLA liability.
Pollution exclusions may also be found by courts to be contrary
to public policy or to the primary purpose of D&O liability
insurance. Under close comparison, the provisions of the D&O
liability insurance policies' pollution exclusion clauses appear
analogous to a regulatory agency exclusion. 16 1 Courts are in
disagreement as to whether such regulatory agency exclusions
violate public policy or are contrary to the primary purpose of the
insurance policy. 162 Regulatory agency exclusions are typically
denied effect by the courts if they are aimed at actions involving the
19 See supra note 155 (discussing a National Union Policy).
160 See National Union Policy, supra note 111, Form 47353, cl. 1, Coverage A
(stating "[tihe Insurer shall, in accordance with and subject to Clause 9, advance to
each and every Director and Officer the Defense Costs of... claims prior to their
final disposition.); id. cl. 9 (stating that under Coverage A, "the insurer shall advance
Defense Costs prior to the final disposition of the claim" unless corporate charter or
bylaws, or common or statutory law require or permit advancement of defense costs).
161 See Chubb policy, supra note 111, cl. 3.1(d). A typical regulatory exclusion is
discussed in American Casualty Co. v. FDIC, 677 F. Supp. 600, 602 (N.D. Iowa 1987),
affd in part and rev'd in part, Nos. 90-2402NI, 90-2445NI, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
21968 (8th Cir. Sept. 18, 1991). The exclusion in the policy at issue read:
It is understood and agreed that the Insurer shall not be liable to make
any payment for Loss in connection with any claim made against the
Directors or Officers based upon or attributable to any action or proceeding
brought by or on behalf of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, any other depository
insurance organization, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, or any other national or state regulatory agency ...
including any type of legal action which such agencies have the legal right
to bring.
Id. at 602.
162 Compare Branning v. CNA Ins. Cos., 721 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (W.D. Wash.
1989) (finding that regulatory agency exclusion "is contrary to federal policy") and
American Casualty Co. v. FSLIC, 704 F. Supp. 898, 903 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (finding
regulatory agency exclusion to be ambiguous and voiding it on the ground that the
"court will not construe an exclusion so broadly as to eviscerate the policy") with
Continental Casualty Co. v. Allen, 710 F. Supp. 1088, 1098-1100 (N.D. Tex. 1989)
(finding regulatory agency exclusion not to be against public policy).
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Savings & Loan
Insurance Corporation, or the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, as
contrary to the federal policy behind those agencies. 163 In FSLIC
v. Oldenburg,16 4 the district court found that regulatory agency
exclusions do not violate public policy as a matter of law, but are
unenforceable where they contravene a federal agency's ability to
perform its statutory duty. 165 The regulatory agency aspects of a
pollution exclusion would exclude claims arising from an enforce-
ment action brought by the EPA, a federal regulatory agency.
Certainly, denial of coverage for an EPA claim, where the policy
would otherwise cover liability, can be interpreted to contravene the
EPA's statutory duty to clean up hazardous waste sites. This would
be contrary to the public policy of CERCLA as much as a compara-
ble regulatory agency exclusion is in contravention of FIRREA.
166
Congress has announced its intention that the courts determine
whether contractual terms agreed upon by insureds and insurers
(specifically, exclusion provisions) contravene the public policy
behind federal statutes.167 The government's statutory duty as a
conservator or receiver is arguably just as great in preserving the
environment as in preserving the banking industry. Therefore,
courts may find that pollution exclusions are contrary to the public
policy behind the EPA's protection of the environment.
168
163 See e.g., Branning, 721 F. Supp. at 1184 (denying effect to regulatory agency
exclusion as it "substantially hinders FSLIC's exercise of its federal powers and
therefore is contrary to federal policy").
164 671 F. Supp. 720 (D. Utah 1987).
165 See id. at 72324; see also American Casualty Co. v. FDIC, No. 86-4018, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6065, at *58-59 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 26, 1990) (finding the regulatory
agency exclusion was unconscionable, violating both the insured's "reasonable
expectations of insurance coverage" and the insurer's "implied warranty of fitness"),
affd in part and rev'd in part, Nos. 90-2402NI, 90-2445NI, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
21963 (8th Cir. Sept. 18, 1991).
166 See Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery, and EnforcementAct of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
167 See 135 CONG. REc. S10,198 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Garn)
(noting that congressional conferees were neutral regarding regulatory agency
exclusions and that they wanted case law relating to the validity of regulatory
exclusion clauses to develop uninfluenced).
168 The NewJersey Superior Court held, however, that pollution exclusion clauses
do not violate a public policy to protect the environment. See Summit Assocs., Inc.
v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 1235, 1239 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988);
Broadwell Realty Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 528 A.2d 76, 80 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1987) (stating that "[w]hatever the relative merits of the competing
public policies identified and advanced by the parties, we perceive no legal principle
which would permit us to circumvent what the contract says").
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Where the parties' intent to limit the coverage of the policy is
manifest, and yet is disregarded by the courts a real possibility exists
that insurers, unable to limit their exposure to CERCLA liability,
will have no choice but to eliminate their increased exposure. At
that point, the only market mechanism to protect D&Os will no
longer exist. Failure of both public and private responses to
individual CERCLA liability in those states where liability is not
limited by statute will force D&Os to find some other way to protect
themselves from unacceptable personal risk. As a result of the
restrictions on or elimination of commercial insurers' coverage of
such liabilities, a responsible corporation would react to potential
liability by reserving funds in a liability trust, or by self-insuring
through risk pools backed by reinsurers or by a captive insurer.
Because the risk of hazardous waste is generally unforeseen,
potential generators cannot be expected simply to "get out of the
market" of pollution liability.169 Therefore, the only alternative
is for D&Os to "get out of the market" of personal liability and
move their operations to a state providing more substantial
statutory protection.
CONCLUSION
In many ways, the marketplace for environmental liabilities,
plagued by the substantial uncertainty of hazardous waste cleanup
liabilities, is much like the marketplace affected by products liability
uncertainties. 170 As in the products liability market, corporations
suffer from imperfect information regarding risks, instability of tort
law doctrines, and unpredictable shifts in popular attitudes toward
acceptable risks. 171  Unlike products liability markets, however,
those who place a religious faith in insurance cannot gain more
protection by getting more religion. 172 History has shown that
liability insurers will not respond to the uncertainties of environ-
mental law by increasing premium charges in the face of uncertain-
169 In other areas of potential liability, it is possible for businesses simply to "get
out of the market." See Siliciano, supra note 150, at 1851 n.108 (discussing withdrawal
of drug and IUD manufacturers from the market when product liability became too
great).
170 See id. at 1830-33, 1850-53 (discussing the "turbulent market" of products
liability).
171 See id. at 1831-32.
172 See Patricia M. Danzon, Comments on Landes and Posner: A Positive Economic
Analysis of Products Liability, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 569,573 (1985) (noting that producers
will overinsure when faced with legal instability).
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ties. Instead, they may attempt to withdraw from the marketplace
of pollution liability coverage altogether.
173
One commentator has suggested that because industry "is in a
better position to calculate its own risks than the insurers, industry-
owned mutual insurance pools might have a comparative advantage
over traditional insurers." 174 Such pools have been successfully
developed by the members of the nuclear industry and the oil indus-
try.175 Ultimately, regulatory policy for employing insurance as
a "market-oriented tool" for controlling environmental damag-
es176 may be a federal or state government established insurance
program. 17 7 Certainly, D&Os, who are already subject to strict
regulations under federal securities laws, would be prime candidates
for a federal insurance pooling arrangement. Such an arrangement
might be similar to the existing arrangement under Price-Anderson
for nuclear licensees. 178 Federal limited liability statutes would
173 See KATZMAN, supra note 104, at 83-85 (noting the dramatic withdrawal of
insurers from the pollution liability market in 1984, following decisions going against
insurers); D'Arcy & Herricks, supra note 18, at 77 (noting that the market was all but
eliminated in 1984, and that by 1988, coverage was expensive and difficult to obtain).
174 Martin T. Katzman, Pollution Liability Insurance and Catastrophic Environmental
Risk, J. RIsK & INS., Mar. 1988, at 75, 93.
17 These two industries use different methods to pool risks, both of which can be
applied to the risk of hazardous waste release. The oil industry insures its member's
refineries through an industry-owned and industry-monitored risk pool, known as Oil
Insurance Limited. See Louise Kertesz, OIL Sets Example For Other Captives, Bus. INS.,
Apr. 30, 1990, at 136, 136.
In accordance with the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988), a
legislatively-initiated insurance program, the nuclear industry has formed two separate
pools of members that are insured by independent insurance companies: the Nuclear
Energy Liability Insurance Association and the Mutual Atomic Energy Liability
Underwriters. See Francis X. Boylan, The Nuclear Risk: Conventional Insurance
Exclusions, Private and Governmental Coverages, 42 CPCUJ. 220, 221 (1987). Virtually
all of the significant property and casualty insurance companies throughout the world
have participated in these pooling arrangements, as primary insurers and reinsurers.
See id.
176 See Katzman, supra note 174, at 94.
177 For example, the 1975 amendments to the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210 (1988), obligate each large power reactor licensee to pay a "deferred
premium" of up to $5 million per nuclear incident, per licensee's reactor, for
incurred losses sustained by any licensee that exceeds the government mandated
financial protection requirement. See Boylan, supra note 175, at 229. Both the
Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association and the Mutual Atomic Energy
Liability Underwriters agreed to absorb up to $30 million in credit risks for licensees
who fail to pay. See id. See generally States Acting on Liability Insurance, 16 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 2140 (March 28, 1986) (noting that some states may attempt to provide
environmental regulatory insurance coverage at the state level).
178 See Boylan, supra note 175, at 220-21.
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then apply along the lines of those limited liability statutes already
existing in some states. 179 On the other hand, if regulated at the
state level, state pollution liability insurance for D&Os would accord
with the rationale behind existing state law liability limits for
corporate managers,180 and would provide preemptive protection
of individuals from CERCLA liability for funding of cleanups.
81
The problem of unforeseen environmental effects of managerial
decisions is not one that will be easily overcome. Indemnity
provides little comfort to the executive faced with bearing the
burden of personally litigating a CERCLA action which may extend
for years with continuingjoinder of PRPs and negotiations with the
EPA. Statutory limits on potential liability are not available in all
states, and may be preempted by the public policy behind CERGLA
in states where such statutes do exist. For the present, where
CERCLA is found to be predominant, there is only risk-risk that no
sector of the insurance marketplace willingly seeks to reduce
through insurance coverage.
This is a far cry from the situation in the nineteenth century
when steam boilers were being developed for industrial purpos-
es.18 2 Where developing technology offered both the promise of
economic return and the substantial risk of explosion, insurers
assumed a leadership role by creating an incentive to have safety
features in the testing of boiler models, by monitoring the insureds'
premises, and by reducing rates for boilers having a lower probabili-
ty of loss. 8 In that situation, however, the only risk-determinant
was the physical danger of boiler explosion. In the CERCLA
situation, there are not only the physical dangers of release and
179 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
180 Some considerations behind statutory liability limits also apply to public
insurance protection: fairness, where the potential liability is excessive compared to
the defendant's culpability; economic logic, where strict liability or liability for
negligence might lead risk-averse management to adopt more conservative policies
than are economically efficient; and insurance costs, where government agencies can
monitor insureds and regulate premiums on grounds of equity and risk-creating
behavior. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 67, § 7.17 cmt. c,
at 227; Katzman, supra note 174, at 93.
181 The McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15
(1988), exempts the states' regulation of insurance from the reach of federal laws,
such as CERCLA. See id. § 1012(b) ("No Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance .... unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance .. .).
182 See D'Arcy & Herricks, supra note 18, at 77.
183 See id.
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contamination, but the moral hazard of risk-creating behavior, the
risk of administrative agencies changing the standards of "contami-
nation," and the uncertainty of judicial construction of liability
statutes and insurance policies in light of the public policy ex-
pressed by such statutes.
In the midst of this environment of uncertainty, individual risk
further exaggerates these effects. Corporate managers must
continue to operate their corporations as best as they can-charged
with fiduciary duties toward the shareholders on the one hand, but
vulnerable to individual liability on the other hand.18 4 No legal
standard of protection exists for those D&Os who by act or by
chance find themselves personally associated with a Superfund
site.185 The concept of fiduciary duty of D&Os to shareholders
can be broadened to apply to decisions affecting the environment
as well. Insurance would then be sought only in those situations
where the fiduciary duty of corporate managers to the government
environment had been breached.
Liability insurance has potential to act as an alternative to
government regulation by allowing insurers to force safer industrial
practices.1 8 6 As long as insurance is available, it will continue to
be the salve of choice for courts to apply where there is individual
liability for hazardous waste cleanup. A tremendous body of law has
developed in the judicial interpretation of CGL policies, covering
the liabilities of the corporation as a whole. In the situation where
the fiduciary duty to the corporation nor the government has not
been breached, individual D&Os may be covered by the corpora-
tion's CGL policy as "insured(s)." 18 7  Simply by including the
184 The high remedial costs of deaning up industrial waste sites in the United
States constitute only a small fraction of industrial pollution prevention costs. See H.
Smets, CompensationforExceptional Environmental Damage Caused by Industrial Activities,
in INSURING AND MANAGING HAZARDOUS RISKS, supra note 8, at 105. The risk of
more stringent operating controls, therefore, arguablyinfluences the decision-maker
more than possible compensation of third parties. See id. at 106.
185 Ironically, this is true even though Congress has expressed a public policy to
encourage insurance and indemnification. See CERCLA, § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(e)(1) (1988) (providing that "[n]othing in this subsection shall bar any
agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any
liability under this section").
186 See Baram, supra note 8, at 418.
18 7 A large volume of common law regarding the interpretation of CGL policies
has been developed (favorable to corporations in all jurisdictions) which would reduce
the risk associated with environmental decisions. See supra notes 144-45 and
accompanying text (noting cases discussing whether a PRP letter triggers CGL
coverage); see also supra note 152 (providing source listing numerous cases regarding
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corporation's D&Os in the definition of the "insured(s)" in the CGL
policy, an alternative to uncertain judicial construction of D&O
liability policies and an additional potential source of coverage for
personal liabilities will be available. In an insurance marketplace
where fault-based liability relies on the outcome of causation
findings, insurers will assume a leadership role by monitoring the
activities and decisions of insureds (both corporations and individu-
als) to determine whether CGL policy coverage or D&O policy
coverage applies. Moreover, insureds would have a real incentive
to act with good faith and to use their best judgment in decisions
involving hazardous waste in order to receive more certain coverage.
In the meantime, D&O liability insurers must take an active role
in the litigation decisions of their insureds and in their negotiations
with the EPA to ensure that a D&O liability policy is not being used
to supplement a corporation's CGL policy. Insurers are likely to
remain the primary source for environmental cleanup costs, no
matter how explicit they attempt to make their desire to be relieved
of the pollution liability burden. As one Justice Department official
stated in justifying appropriation of insurers' funds to pay for
Superfund cleanup costs:
"We were facing a $100 million shortfall in coverage of costs of
cleaning up dioxin contamination ... and had exhausted other
avenues of recovery.... We don't want to get in the middle of
what is a conflict between one part of corporate America [(insur-
ers)] and another [(insureds)], but if appropriate cases come up,
and we have no place left to look for cleanup funding, we will do
so again."
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CGL policy's pollution exclusion clause).
1 ' Susan Bruninga et al., Outlook 1991: Reauthorization of Waste Law Tops 1991
Congressional Agenda; EPA Faces Massive Regulatoiy Task in Wake of Clean Air
Amendments, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1661, 1668 (Jan. 11, 1991) (quoting Richard B.
Stewart, assistant attorney general for the Justice Department's Environment and
Natural Resources Division).

